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All types of monopoly are not created equal in the US
economy. In this study, Barak Richman of Duke Uni-
versity Law School emphasizes that health care
providers with market power enjoy substantially more
pricing freedom than monopolists in other markets. 
Though problems of excessive concentration and
insufficient competition in health care markets are not
new, markets for hospital services have recently pre-
sented the most serious competition policy issues. Tra-
ditional antitrust enforcement tools have done little to
halt the extraordinary consolidation in local hospital
markets over the last two decades, which has driven
higher price increases for inpatient services. Compre-
hensive, US-style health insurance further enhances the
pricing freedom of health care firms with market power. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of
2010 (PPACA) does little to address the monopoly
problem and may even worsen it. The highly regu-
lated and heavily subsidized regime ahead under the
PPACA already has triggered a feverish scramble
among health industry firms (insurers, pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers, physician practice groups, and
device makers, as well as hospitals) to get bigger mar-
ket share and also become better connected politically
to ensure that they will be among the politically
dependent survivor incumbents in the years ahead.
With most of the key decisions in health care financ-
ing, coverage, and even treatment likely to be made in
Washington, investments in winning future rounds of
political competition are likely to trump responsive-
ness to market competition.
The PPACA poses some additional barriers to
more vigorous competition in health services. Its
“minimum medical loss ratio” rules for insurers may
superficially appeal to some insurance purchasers but
could further disarm payers in aggressive price nego-
tiations with providers and stifle insurers’ investments
in innovative monitoring and improvement of health
care delivery. The eventual scope and scale of the act’s
regulatory requirements for “essential health benefits”
also could discourage investments in low-cost, non-
medical alternative interventions that can produce
results superior to mandated traditional care.
Richman observes that whereas monopolies in
other parts of the economy enable sellers to charge
higher prices while reducing output, comprehensive
third-party health insurance coverage enables many
cost-insensitive patients to pay monopolist providers’
asking prices rather than being induced to give up
desirable health care goods and services. This means
“too much of a good thing,” at excessive prices. The
combination of market concentration and generous
insurance means consumers and providers end up
overspending even more on costly health care.
We need better solutions to this chronic problem
of too much concentration and too little competition,
Editor’s Note
including not just tighter review of new hospital
mergers and consolidations but also
• Closer monitoring of the competitive effects of
emerging affordable care organizations;
• Curbing new abuses of “state action” immunity;
• Requiring unbundling of monopolized health
care services;
• Challenging anticompetitive terms in insurer-
provider contracts;
• Promoting interregional competition in health
care services; and
• Encouraging nonmedical substitutes for “essen-
tial” health benefits.
Richman looks at each of these solutions in detail in
this thought-provoking paper.
Instead of doubling down on the “metabolic disor-
der” triggered by public policies that encourage over-
consumption of conventional, highly subsidized health
insurance—or resorting to tighter price controls and
public utility–style regulation of politically mandated
coverage, we should consider some better remedial
medicine—a stronger dose of market competition.
Thomas P. Miller is a resident fellow at AEI. He directs
AEI’s Beyond Repeal and Replace project.
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1Executive Summary
Health care providers with market power enjoy sub-
stantially more pricing freedom than monopolists in
other markets, for a reason not generally recognized:
US-style health insurance. Consequently, monopolies
in health care cause undesirable redistribution of
wealth and inefficient allocation of resources, both of
which burden consumers at levels beyond those of
other monopolists. 
The unusual costliness of monopoly power in
health care markets demands far more policy atten-
tion than it has received. For starters, the health sec-
tor needs a more aggressive antitrust policy that
effectively prevents the creation of new provider mar-
ket power through mergers, alliances, or government
immunity. An immediate need is ensuring that the
formation of accountable care organizations under the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA),
which in theory might achieve efficiencies through
vertical integrations, do not primarily lead to hori-
zontal integrations that give providers additional mar-
ket power. 
However, because antitrust policy has been so
inadequate for so long in the health sector, and
because it remains unlikely that courts or enforcement
agencies will undo past mergers that created these
powerful provider monopolies, policymakers should
pursue additional strategies for contesting existing
monopolies. One approach is to apply antitrust rules
against “tying” arrangements so that purchasers can
combat providers’ profit-enhancing practice of over-
charging for large bundles of services instead of trying
to exploit separately any monopolies they possess in
various submarkets. Another strategy is to use antitrust
or regulatory rules to prohibit anticompetitive provi-
sions, such as “antisteering” or “most-favored-nation”
clauses, in provider-insurer contracts. Policymakers
could also help restore price competition in monopo-
lized markets by enabling private payers to negotiate
prices for specific provider services and encouraging
insurers to expand the scope of competition—via
medical tourism, for example, or configuring innova-
tive health care delivery that bypasses many of the
embedded costs in the current system.
Some commentators have suggested that the
provider monopoly problem is severe enough to war-
rant consideration of a more radical alternative: regu-
lating provider prices. By restricting how insurers can
purchase health services, the PPACA might effectuate
a regulatory regime that significantly limits price and
nonprice competition. However, even under the
PPACA room remains for creative regulatory policies
that enhance competition in health care markets and
encourage better uses of our increasingly scarce
health care dollars.

3Concentration in Health Care Markets: 
Chronic Problems and Better Solutions
Introduction
Health care providers and suppliers with monopoly
power impose enormous costs on both private and
public budgets, yet their distortions on the US mar-
ketplace have avoided sorely needed scrutiny and
redress.1 In fact, many policymakers and commenta-
tors have taken a benign view of health care monop-
olies, suggesting that they serve important public
purposes and thus should receive favorable treat-
ment from antitrust rules designed to require com-
petition. The truth is, however, that health care
monopolies—for-profit and nonprofit alike—are
more, not just equally, harmful to both consumers
and the general welfare than monopolies of other
kinds. They lead to higher prices, create greater inef-
ficiencies, and cause larger economic rents from
favorable regulatory treatment than even typical
monopolists. They impose economic costs that sim-
ply are not sustainable. 
The main culprit responsible for making health
care monopolies so costly is health insurance—at
least, the kind that covers most Americans—and the
rules, regulations, and customs that shape its provi-
sion in US markets. Certain features of US-style health
insurance greatly enhance the pricing freedom of health
care firms with market power, producing much larger
monopoly profits and much greater redistribution of
wealth than would result from monopoly power in
markets where consumers face prices directly. US-
style health insurance also fosters serious inefficien-
cies in resource allocation, albeit not the kind of
misallocation that economic theory normally associ-
ates with the exercise of monopoly power.2
These distortive consequences of combining
monopoly power with US-style health insurance will
only amplify after the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (PPACA), enacted by Congress in 2010,
expands the ranks of the insured. The PPACA not
only does little to address the current monopoly prob-
lem but will even add substantially to providers’ and
suppliers’ profits by increasing the pervasiveness of
US-style insurance. Indeed, many elements in the
PPACA restrict the freedom of third-party purchasers
to choose less expensive coverage and limit variation
in insurance products, which will further enshrine the
harmful features of US-style insurance that magnify
the costs of monopoly power. Unless a more effective
competition policy can be implemented in the health
sector, many millions of additional Americans will
soon carry exactly the kind of health coverage that
currently serves provider and supplier monopolists so
well. If anything, the PPACA makes a strong antimo-
nopoly policy in health care even more imperative. 
One initial policy recommendation is that mergers,
consolidations, and other potentially monopolistic
practices of health care providers—including the very
recent wave of efforts to consolidate market power
around so-called accountable care organizations
(ACOs)—should be subject to special, not relaxed,
vigilance by antitrust agencies and courts. But
because antitrust policy has for too long permitted
health care monopolies to grow in many markets, we
need other policy initiatives to mitigate the harm from
already-concentrated provider markets. Policymak-
ers, therefore, should scrutinize whether current
health care monopolists are seeking to illegally
exploit, expand, or enshrine their market power.
Common practices such as bundling services,
demanding exclusive dealings with insurers, and
restricting price shopping should invite rigorous
antitrust attention. Policymakers could also help
restore price competition in monopolized markets by
enabling private payers to negotiate prices for specific
provider services and encouraging insurers to expand
the scope of competition—via medical tourism, for
example, or configuring innovative health care deliv-
ery that bypasses many of the embedded costs in the
current system. 
Despite its great economic costs and conse-
quences, the potency of this combination of
monopoly power and the US-style insurance
system has gone largely unnoticed by the antitrust
agencies and economists. It is additionally trou-
bling that Congress largely ignored these severely
detrimental aspects of the American system of
financing health care, including its potential to fur-
ther enrich industry monopolists and impose
unbearable inefficiencies, when deliberating and
enacting the PPACA. 
Nonetheless, policymakers and industry leaders
still can avail themselves of several tools to infuse
competition into health care markets. The case for a
more rigorous competition policy in the health care
sector is significantly stronger than even its advocates
have generally appreciated. Despite past failure to rec-
ognize fully the dangers of health care monopolies,
today’s innovative payers, nonmonopolist providers,
and policymakers can exert sufficient competitive
pressures to begin controlling costs and bringing
value to premium payers. 
How Health Insurance Compounds the Harms
of Provider Monopoly
The past several decades have witnessed extraordi-
nary consolidation in local hospital markets, with a
particularly aggressive merger wave occurring in the
1990s. By 1995, hospital merger and acquisition
activity was nine times its level at the start of the
decade, and by 2003, almost 90 percent of Ameri-
cans living in the nation’s larger metropolitan statisti-
cal areas (MSAs) faced highly concentrated provider
markets.3 This wave of hospital consolidation, pre-
dictably, was alone responsible for price increases for
inpatient services of “at least five percent and likely
significantly more,” and similarly responsible for
price increases of 40 percent where merging hospi-
tals are closely located.4 A second merger wave from
2006 to 2009 significantly increased the hospital
concentration in thirty MSAs,5 and the vast majority
of Americans are now subject to monopoly power in
their local hospital markets. 
In economic theory, monopolies are objectionable
because they enable sellers to charge higher prices
and thereby cause some consumers (who would be
willing to pay a competitive price) to forgo enjoy-
ment of the monopolized good or service. Fortu-
nately, such output-reducing effects are greatly
lessened in health care markets because the many
patients covered by health insurance can easily pay
monopolist providers’ asking prices rather than
being induced to give up these desirable goods and
services. But unfortunately, precisely because there is
no output reduction in response to monopoly price
increases, health insurance both amplifies the redis-
tributive effects of provider and supplier monopolies
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and inflicts allocative inefficiencies that are arguably
more distortive and costly than those caused by typ-
ical monopolists. 
Supra-Monopoly Pricing. In the textbook model, a
monopoly redistributes wealth from consumers to
powerful firms. The monopolist’s higher price enables
it to capture for itself much of the welfare gain, or “sur-
plus,” consumers would have enjoyed if they had been
able to purchase the valued good or service at a lower
competitive price. In health care, insurance puts the
monopolist in an even stronger position because con-
sumers do not face, and therefore are not deterred by,
monopoly prices. This effect appears in theory as a
steepened demand curve for the monopolized good or
service. Whereas most monopolists encounter reduced
demand with each price increase, health insurance
mutes the marginal consequences of rising prices.
If health insurers perfectly represented their sub-
scribers’ preferences, their policies would reflect con-
sumers’ demand curves and pay for services at prices
that individual insureds would, absent insurance, be
willing to pay themselves. But deficiencies in the
design and administration of real-world health insur-
ance prevent insurers from reproducing their
insureds’ preferences and thus heavily magnify
monopoly power. For legal, regulatory, and other rea-
sons, health insurers in the United States are in no
position (as consumers themselves would be) to
refuse to pay a provider’s high price even if it appears
to exceed the service’s likely value to the patient.
Instead, insurers are bound by both deep-rooted con-
vention and their contracts with subscribers to pay for
any service deemed advantageous (and termed “med-
ically necessary” under rather generous legal stand-
ards) for the patient’s health, whatever the cost.6
Consequently, close substitutes for a provider’s serv-
ices do not check its market power as they ordinarily
would for other goods and services. Indeed, putting
aside the modest effects of cost sharing on patients’
choices, the only substitute treatments or services
insured patients are likely to accept are those they
regard as the best ones available. Unlike the ordinary
monopolist that sells directly to cost-conscious con-
sumers, the rewards to a monopolist who sells goods or
services purchased through health insurance may eas-
ily and substantially exceed the aggregate consumer
surplus patients would derive at competitive prices.
Thus, health insurance enables a monopolist of a
covered service to charge substantially more than
the textbook “monopoly price,” thereby earning
even more than the usual “monopoly profit.” The
magnitude of the monopoly-plus-insurance distor-
tion has sometimes surprised even its beneficiaries.7
Of course, since third-party payers (and not
patients) are covering the interim bill, these extraor-
dinary profits made possible by health insurance are
earned at the expense of those bearing the cost of
insurance. Insureds, even when their employers are
the direct purchasers of health insurance, are ulti-
mately the ones seeing their take-home pay shrink
from hikes in insurance premiums caused by
provider monopolies.
Discussions of antitrust issues in the health care
sector rarely, if ever, explicitly observe how health
insurance in general, or US-style insurance in par-
ticular, enhances dominant sellers’ ability to exploit
consumers. Although scholars have previously
observed that prices for health services are much
higher in the United States than in other Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) nations (without observable differences in
quality),8 and although many have observed that
provider market power has been a significant factor in
inflating those prices,9 few have observed the syner-
gistic effects of monopoly and health insurance.
Perhaps more notably, despite the huge implica-
tions for consumers and the general welfare, the spe-
cial redistributive effects of monopoly in health care
markets are not mentioned in the antitrust agencies’
definitive statements of enforcement policy in the
health care sector.10 Antitrust analysis of hospital
mergers—as well as of other actions and practices that
enhance provider or supplier market power—must
therefore explicitly recognize the impact of insurance
on health care markets. The nation will find it far
harder, perhaps literally impossible, to afford the
PPACA’s impending extension of generous health cov-
erage to millions of additional consumers if monopo-
lists of health care services and products can continue
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to charge not what consumers would prefer to bear
but instead what insurers, because of severe market
failures, are required to bear.11
Misallocative Consequences. Allowing providers to
gain market power through mergers not only causes
extraordinary redistributions of wealth but also con-
tributes to severely inefficient resource allocation. In
an ironic contrast to the output restrictions associated
with monopoly in economic theory, the misallocative
effects cited here mostly involve the production and
consumption of too much—rather than too little—of
a generally good thing. These misallocations are both
theoretically and practically important. They provide
still another new reason for special antitrust and other
vigilance against providers’ monopolistic practices,
particularly scrutinizing anticompetitive mergers and
powerful joint ventures.
Even in the absence of monopoly, conventional
health insurance enables consumers and providers to
overspend on costly health care. This is, of course, the
familiar effect of moral hazard—economists’ term for
the tendency of patients and providers to spend
insurers’ money more freely than they would spend
the patient’s own. To be sure, some moral-hazard
costs are justified as the unavoidable price of protect-
ing individuals against unpredictable, high-cost
events. But American health insurers are significantly
constrained in introducing contractual, administra-
tive, and other measures to contain such costs. US-
style health insurance, therefore, is constrained in
limiting the allocative inefficiencies from moral haz-
ard. Although uncontrolled moral hazard is a prob-
lem throughout the health sector, combining
inefficiently designed insurance with provider
monopolies compounds the economic harm.
The extraordinary profitability of health-sector
monopolies also introduces a dynamic source of
resource misallocation by intensifying firms’ usual
inducement to seek market dominance. The introduc-
tions of new technologies have been a primary source
of health care cost increases over the past several
decades—responsible for as much as 40–50 percent.12
And even though many innovations offer only mar-
ginal value, their monopoly power under intellectual
property laws secure lucrative payments from insurers
whose hands are tied. Although many have recognized
that new technologies are a principal source of unsus-
tainable increases in health care costs, and several oth-
ers have recognized how the moral hazard of insurance
has both fueled technology-driven cost increases and
distorted innovation incentives (toward cost-increasing
innovations at the expense of cost-reducing innova-
tions),13 few have recognized that this is a general prob-
lem with combining monopoly with insurance rather
than a generic inefficiency from moral hazard.
Provider monopolies also inflict economic harm
by spending heavily to sustain current monopoly 
barriers. Indeed, Richard Posner has theorized that a
monopoly’s most serious misallocative effect is not the
output reduction recognized in theoretical models but
instead the monopolist’s strenuous efforts to obtain,
defend, and extend market power.14 This is especially
true for health care monopolists because so many
are maintained with legal and regulatory barriers—
certificate-of-need laws, licensure requirements, and
regulations restricting limitations on provider net-
works, for example. Thus, health care monopolists
are willing to spend heavily (up to the private value of
the monopoly) on legal and political resources that
impede competition. This contrasts starkly with the
narrative in which we reward monopolies (with
monopoly profits) for their investing in the “superior
skill, foresight, and industry” that creates social value.15
Mergers of all kinds deserve serious scrutiny from
antitrust enforcers because they often amount to an
easy and unjustified shortcut to gaining market
power. Although proponents of consolidations in
health care provider markets usually tout anticipated
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efficiencies from combining and rationalizing opera-
tions, such efficiencies are seldom identified with pre-
cision, and the opportunity to increase their
bargaining power vis-à-vis private payers appears to be
the far likelier explanation for all such mergers in con-
centrated health care markets.16
In light of the disproportionately large share of
national resources already being spent on health care
in the United States compared to every other nation
in the world,17 the enormous burden of distortive
health-sector monopolies provide compelling, even
alarming, reasons to apply the antitrust laws with par-
ticular force against health care providers and suppli-
ers with market power. If antitrust enforcement is not
up to the task of restoring competition in markets
where it is lacking, political actors may resort instead
to regulatory measures of mixed economic wisdom.
The Problem of Nonprofit Hospitals. Nonprofit hos-
pitals remain the primary provider of the nation’s hos-
pital care, responsible for 73 percent of admissions, 76
percent of outpatient visits, and 75 percent of hospital
expenditures.18 Yet ever since the antitrust laws were
first applied systematically in the health care sector in
the mid-1970s, some judges and scholars have resis-
ted giving the statutory policy of fostering competition
its due in health care settings, especially in cases
involving nonprofit hospitals. Between 1995 and
2000, for example, antitrust enforcers encountered
sustained judicial resistance when challenging mergers
of nonprofit hospitals and suffered a six-case losing
streak in such cases in the federal courts.19
Although most of those pro-merger decisions
ostensibly turned on findings of fact (mostly in iden-
tifying a geographic market in which to estimate the
merger’s probable effects on competition), those find-
ings were often so arbitrary as to signify judicial skep-
ticism about the wisdom of applying antitrust law
rigorously in hospital markets.20 The government has
more recently won back some of the legal ground it
lost,21 but its inability to apply antitrust law rigor-
ously and systematically in the big business that
health care has become is one important reason why
many health care markets are now dominated by
firms with alarming pricing power.22
One source of judicial resistance to antitrust
enforcement in these cases—and a source of protec-
tion for would-be nonprofit hospital monopolists—
was the belief, espoused by some vocal academics, that
nonprofit hospitals do not exploit monopoly power
they might enjoy. This view is now widely discredited,
with abundant empirical evidence reporting that non-
profit hospitals do, as economic theory would predict,
take advantage of their pricing power.23
Moreover, as the previous section of this report
makes clear, this wrangling over whether nonprofit
monopolists are less likely to behave worse than for-
profit ones severely missed the most important theo-
retical concerns and empirical evidence. While
researchers fretted over whether organizational form
influenced pricing policies, they did not recognize
the overwhelming danger of combining hospital
monopolies—for-profit and nonprofit alike—with
US-style insurance. 
A second source of judicial resistance to antitrust
enforcement has been the implicit, and often explicit,
belief harbored by many judges that nonprofit hospi-
tals monopolists would put to good use any market
power they might possess.24 Great reason exists to
question this judicial presumption as well. Non-
profit, tax-exempt hospitals are required by their
charters and the federal tax code to retain their prof-
its and use them only for “charitable” purposes.
Thus, if one could assume that the exercise of market
power by nonprofit hospitals generally shifts wealth
from richer individuals to poorer ones, rather than
the opposite, there would be at least an argument for
viewing nonprofit hospital monopolies as benign for
antitrust purposes. Although such an argument
would be based on a questionable reading of the
antitrust statutes, one widely noted case allowed
prestigious universities to act anticompetitively to
direct their limited scholarship funds toward lower-
income students.25 One easily senses in hospital
merger cases a similar judicial dispensation in favor
of nonprofit enterprises that raise prices for seem-
ingly progressive purposes.
But however antitrust doctrine views (or should
view) monopolies dedicated to progressive pursuits, it
is far from clear that nonprofit hospitals reliably use
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their dominant market positions to redistribute wealth
only in progressive directions. A controversial ruling
by the Internal Revenue Service interpreted the Rev-
enue Code’s charitable-purposes requirement very
broadly, allowing hospitals to maintain tax-exempt sta-
tus if they expend untaxed surpluses on anything that
arguably “promotes health.”26 This includes much
more than just caring for the indigent. In fact, that rul-
ing (which relaxed an earlier requirement that an
exempt hospital “must be operated to the extent of its
financial ability for those not able to pay for the serv-
ices rendered”27) came when the Medicare and Med-
icaid programs were relatively new and private health
insurance was expanding. Certainly the pervasiveness
of public and private insurance, particularly if the
PPACA is fully implemented, undermines the primary
rationale behind encouraging nonprofit hospitals to be
charitable in the original sense. Moreover, federal,
state, and local governments separately and substan-
tially subsidize nonprofit hospitals’ most clearly chari-
table activities, through both special tax exemptions
and direct financial assistance. Thus, activities that
were provided originally in exchange for tax-exempt
status are now largely paid for through direct govern-
ment tax subsidies or insurance payments. 
In fact, true charity has in recent years accounted
for only a relatively small fraction of what nonprofit
hospitals do in return for their federal tax exemp-
tions.28 Such hospitals can usually qualify for exemp-
tions merely by spending their surpluses on medical
research; training various types of health care person-
nel; or, most important, acquiring state-of-the-art
facilities and equipment, which (ironically) can also
secure and enhance their market dominance. Many of
these activities confer significant benefits on interest
groups and individuals that are relatively high on the
income scale. To be sure, most of the activities and
projects financed from hospital surpluses are hard to
criticize in the abstract. But many of them are not so
obviously progressive in their redistributive effects (or
otherwise so obviously worthy of public support) that
antitrust prohibitions should be relaxed so hospitals
can finance more of them.
These minimal requirements for tax exemption pro-
vide no assurance that nonprofit hospital monopolists
are spending their extraordinary surpluses only to
address individuals’ or society’s most pressing needs.
Indeed, only if one takes the common but unthinking
or self-serving view that health spending, like beauty, is
its own excuse for being is it possible to believe that
nonprofit hospitals’ discretionary activities and projects
necessarily represent socially appropriate uses for the
resources consumed. To the contrary, managers of non-
profit firms have incentives to maintain monopolies to
fund the construction and expansion of empires that
enhance their self-esteem and professional influence.
Such empire building is most easily accomplished by
obtaining market power and using it to generate sur-
pluses with which to further entrench and extend a
firm’s dominance.
For several decades, ever since private insurance,
Medicare, and Medicaid substantially reduced hospi-
tals’ charitable burdens and began to pour new
resources into health care, nonprofit monopolies have
been channeling funds into health care uses that,
other than being labeled “charitable” for tax purposes,
have never been reliably legitimized as priorities by
either market or political processes. In fact, overpro-
duction and overconsumption of health services is
currently an arguably bigger problem than scarcity.
Therefore, permitting nonprofits to accumulate
monopoly power to subsidize the provision of addi-
tional health services exacerbates, not solves, the
nation’s health care crisis. In the aftermath of a deep
recession, policies that increase spending on expen-
sive but questionably or marginally valuable health
services can only divert newly scarce (often bor-
rowed) resources away from what many consumers
or taxpayers might regard as far more essential uses.
A Head Tax. The bulk of the financial responsibility
to sustain providers’ supra monopoly pricing, excess
output, and “charitable” activities ultimately falls more
or less equally on individuals bearing the cost of health
insurance premiums. To be sure, local and federal tax-
payers pick up part of the bill through subsidies, enti-
tlement programs, assorted multipliers in Medicare
reimbursement, and the like. But the lion’s share of this
financial burden falls on private premium payers in a
manner that closely resembles a “head tax”—that is, a
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tax levied equally on individuals regardless of their
income or ability to pay. Few methods of public
finance are more regressive and unfair than this. Those
who take a benign view of the seemingly good works
of health care providers should focus more attention
on who (ultimately) pays for and who benefits from
those nominally charitable activities.29
The regressive redistributive effects of nonprofit
hospitals’ monopolies appear never to have been
given due weight in antitrust appraisals of hospital
mergers.30 To be sure, pure economic theory with-
holds judgment on the rightness or wrongness of
redistributing income because economists have no
objective basis for preferring one distribution of
wealth over another. But the antitrust laws principally
enjoy general political support because the consum-
ing public resents the idea of illegitimate monopolists
enriching themselves at the public’s expense.31
In sum, certain judges’ sanguine attitude toward
nonprofit monopolies has contributed to what now is
a crisis in provider markets. The ubiquity of nonprofit
hospitals with market power now constitutes a sig-
nificant source of the provider monopoly problem in
health care. Recognizing the extraordinary pricing
freedom that US-style health insurance confers on
monopolist providers, along with the magnified
losses in efficiency and distributional equity that such
pricing freedom causes, one can conclude only that
these judicial sympathies played significant roles in
what can only be described as a colossal failure of
antitrust enforcement. 
A New Antitrust Agenda?
Can government, through antitrust enforcement or
otherwise, do anything about the problem of
provider and supplier market power in health care
markets? Although the enforcement agencies and
courts should certainly scrutinize new hospital merg-
ers and similar consolidations with greater skepti-
cism, preventing new mergers cannot correct past
failures to maintain competition in hospital and
other markets. Enforcers may challenge the legality
of previously consummated mergers, as the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) did in the Evanston North-
western case, but practical and judicial difficulties in
fashioning a remedy make it difficult to restore the
competition that the original merger destroyed. The
FTC was unwilling, for example, to demand the dis-
solution of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp.
and instead merely ordered its jointly operated hos-
pitals to negotiate separate contracts with health
plans—a remedy, incidentally, that gave the negotiat-
ing team of neither hospital any reason to attract
business from the other.32 Although the FTC might
seek more substantial relief to unwind other mergers-
to-monopoly, the general rule seems to be that old,
unlawful mergers are amenable to later breakup only
in the unusual case when the component parts have
not been significantly integrated.33
In any case, given their past skepticism about
antitrust enforcement in health care markets,34 courts
would be hard to enlist in an antitrust campaign to
roll back earlier consolidations. Thus, a policy agenda
capable of redressing the provider monopoly problem
in health care will need to employ other legal and
regulatory instruments. A first order of business
would be to fastidiously prevent the formation of new
provider monopolies, since health care providers con-
tinue to seek opportunities to consolidate—through
the recent wave of ACOs, in particular. Moreover,
health care providers are seeking to consummate
mergers by claiming, through questionable legal argu-
ments, immunity from the antitrust laws. Finally, an
array of other enforcement policies can target monop-
olists behaving badly—those trying to either expand
their monopoly power into currently competitive
markets or foreclose their market to possible entrants.
Thus, several fronts remain available for policymakers
to wage antitrust battles. A new antitrust agenda
begins with recognizing the extraordinary costs to
health care provider monopolies and continues with
aggressive and creative antimonopoly interventions.
The Special Problem of Accountable Care Organi-
zations. A primary target for a revived antitrust
agenda is the emerging ACOs, whose development
the PPACA is designed to stimulate. The PPACA
encourages providers to integrate themselves in ACOs
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for the purpose of implementing “best practices” and
thereby providing high-quality coordinated care at a
low cost. To induce providers to form and practice
within these presumptively more efficient entities, the
PPACA and its implementing regulations instruct the
Medicare program to share with an ACO any cost sav-
ings it can demonstrate, permitting proposed ACOs
either to keep any savings beyond a minimum savings
rate (MSR) of up to 3.9 percent while being insured
against losses or to keep savings beyond an MSR of 2
percent while being exposed to the risk of losses.35
ACOs are being hailed as a meaningful opportunity to
reform our deeply inefficient delivery system, but
promising health policy initiatives often lead to disap-
pointing projects and unintended consequences. One
serious risk in forming ACOs is that they may create
even more aggregation of pricing power in the hands
of providers.
ACOs, in theory, could offer an attractive solution
to problems stemming from the complexity and 
fragmentation of the health care delivery system.36
Together with good information systems and com-
pensation arrangements, vertical integration of com-
plementary health care entities can achieve
important efficiencies by reducing medical errors,
eliminating duplicative services and facilities, and
coordinating elements needed to deliver high-quality,
patient-centered care.37
Skeptics, who include FTC Commissioner
Thomas Rosch, note that “available evidence suggests
that the cost savings [from ACOs] will be very small
to nonexistent” and warn that any purported reduc-
tions in expenditures “will simply be shifted to payors
in the commercial sector.”38 Others have warned that
efforts to replicate early successes in integrated deliv-
ery systems—which serve as models for reformers’
aspirations—have often failed, partly because many
physicians are reluctant to forgo the lucrative possi-
bilities of unconstrained fee-for-service practice and
partly because physicians who do integrate with hos-
pital systems predictably resist adhering to efficiency-
enhancing management. Moreover, many ACOs are
reportedly being sponsored by hospitals, which any
efficient delivery system would use sparingly. Hospi-
tal investments might be designed to preempt control
of ACOs, rather than harness their potential efficien-
cies, so any cost savings would come at the expense
of others.
In contrast to the varying views on their potential
benefits, there is widespread agreement that ACOs
could engineer and leverage greater monopoly power
in an already-concentrated health care market.39
Organizers of ACOs are forging collaborations among
entire markets of physicians and hospitals, entities
that would otherwise compete with one another. The
New York Times has reported “a growing frenzy of
mergers involving hospitals, clinics and doctor groups
eager to share costs and savings, and cash in on the
[ACO program’s] incentives.”40 In fact, providers’
main purpose in forming ACOs may not be to achieve
cost savings to share with Medicare but to strengthen
their market power over purchasers in the private sec-
tor. ACOs “may be the latest chapter in the steady
accumulation of market power by hospitals, health
care systems, and physician groups, a sequel to the
waves of mergers in the 1990s when health care enti-
ties sought to counter market pressure from managed
care organizations.”41
Antitrust policymakers therefore should carefully
scrutinize the formation of ACOs. Conventional
antitrust reasoning appropriately permits efficiency
claims to overcome concerns about concentration on
the seller side of the market, and any review of a pro-
posed ACO would certainly consider the potential
benefits of vertical integration. But any antitrust
analysis should also recognize that health insurance
greatly exacerbates the price and misallocative effects
of monopoly. Notwithstanding the special efficiency
claims that can be made on behalf of ACOs, the
potency of health care monopolies strongly warrants
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especially stringent anticoncentration, antimerger
policy in the health care sector. These heightened
dangers should be weighed heavily in appraising an
ACO’s likely market impact.
It remains to be seen whether the FTC and Depart-
ment of Justice (DOJ) will have the opportunity to
apply this necessary level of scrutiny. The revised rules,
released by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS) in November 2011 to implement the
ACOs “Shared Savings Plan,” indicate that the antitrust
agencies will apply the Rule of Reason to determine
whether a proposed ACO will violate the Sherman
Act, and proposals in which an ACO’s independent
participants have low shares within a relevant market
can fall within a “safety zone” to evade scrutiny alto-
gether. Moreover, unlike the proposed rules in March
2011, antitrust review will not be mandatory for pro-
posed ACOs. 
This leaves the implementing agencies with a great
deal of discretion—and keeps their feet far from the
proverbial fire—in ensuring that an ACO complies
with the principles of competition. The agencies
could demand a heightened showing that a proposed
consolidation will generate identifiable efficiencies,
and they similarly might demand that an ACO’s pro-
ponents assume the burden of showing an absence of
significant horizontal effects in local submarket. The
agencies could also impose demanding structural
remedies to illegal concentrations, perhaps encourag-
ing the vertical integration envisioned by the PPACA’s
proponents while reducing the horizontal collabora-
tion that providers so routinely pursue. Finally, the
agencies could impose conduct (nonstructural) reme-
dies to potentially harmful ACOs, such as requiring
nonexclusive contractual arrangements with payers
and, especially, with regional hospitals. How the FTC
and DOJ monitor the formation of ACOs could deter-
mine whether the PPACA meaningfully advances a
(desperately needed) reorganization of health care
delivery or merely offers a loophole to permit greater
consolidation.
The CMS might also fill an independent role in
meaningfully preventing ACOs from furthering anti-
competitive harm in health care marketplaces. The
final rules permit the CMS to share savings with
ACOs only after they meet quality benchmarks,
which the CMS administrators ought to take seri-
ously.42 The rules also require cost and quality report-
ing, and the CMS might require a demonstration of
meaningful quality improvements and cost savings to
receive a continued share of Medicare savings. The
CMS might even condition an ACO’s permission to
market to private payers on its demonstration that its
prices to private payers did not increase significantly
following its formation.
One might wonder, of course, whether a govern-
mental single payer like Medicare has the mission,
impulse, or requisite creativity to foster competitive
private markets for health services. Perhaps the CMS’s
new Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation
could shape the institution’s capacity to affect reform.
It might be equally likely, unfortunately, that Medicare
will aim to preserve its own solvency by encouraging
the shifting of costs to the private sector—and it may
even reward ACOs’ cost shifting as cost savings.43 This
is the danger with using a large and unavoidably inflex-
ible bureaucracy to engineer an effort to induce innova-
tion. Nonetheless, you go to war with the bureaucracy
you have, and the CMS should concentrate its sub-
stantial resources on developing competition-oriented
regulations that cautiously monitor the market impact
of emerging ACOs. 
Challenging “State Action” Immunity. A common
subplot in antitrust law has cartels or monopolists
avoid liability by obtaining sanction from a state or
local government. The “state action immunity” doc-
trine permits states to regulate and even authorize anti-
competitive conduct, provided that (1) there is a
clearly articulated policy designed to displace compe-
tition, and (2) the state actively supervises the conduct
under the regulatory scheme.44 The upshot is that
states can, if they so choose, immunize anticompeti-
tive conduct from Sherman Act liability. Predictable
beneficiaries of state protection have included a
statewide collaboration of raisin growers,45 regional
motor carriers seeking to set common rates,46 and a
town’s politically powerful billboard monopolist.47
The doctrine’s parameters, which turn on what con-
stitutes a “clear articulation” and “active supervision,”
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are notoriously limber.48 Nonetheless, recent efforts by
health care providers to invoke the doctrine have
pushed the outer bounds of reason.49 Perhaps the prof-
itability of health care monopolies has encouraged
providers to develop new, previously ridiculed legal
arguments that would protect their market dominance
from prosecution. In any event, the growing popularity
of invoking state action immunity, and the breadth of
those invocations, needs to be stopped in its tracks, as
the last thing either antitrust law or health policy needs
is immunity for health care monopolists. Limiting the
scope of state action immunity might be the next bat-
tlefront in antitrust enforcement in the health sector.
Three recent efforts to expand state action immu-
nity are now unfolding (unsurprisingly, all involving
the health care industry):
1. In Michigan, the DOJ is suing the state’s Blue-
Cross BlueShield for engaging in anticompeti-
tive agreements with the state’s dominant
provider.50 BlueCross claimed that it is immune
from the Sherman Act because “Michigan cre-
ated Blue Cross Pursuant to a Comprehensive
Health Care Regulatory Scheme.”51
2. In North Carolina, the state’s Board of Dental
Examiners has attracted FTC scrutiny in its
efforts to block nondentists in the state from
providing teeth-whitening goods or services.52
The board sued to block the FTC proceeding,
claiming that it is “an agency of the sovereign
State of North Carolina” and thus is beyond 
the FTC’s prosecution.53
3. Parties pursuing a merger of two hospitals in
Albany-Dougherty County, Georgia—a merger
that would unquestionably create a monopoly—
have claimed immunity from an FTC challenge
because the county’s Hospital Authority nomi-
nally owns the acquiring hospital and thus
would own the monopoly.54
Each of these immunity claims stands on extremely
shaky logic. When Michigan, like all states, enacted a
comprehensive regulatory scheme, it issued no clear
articulation that the regulatory structure would encour-
age or condone anticompetitive contracting. Although
North Carolina ostensibly authorized the Board of Den-
tal Examiners to engage in some self-governance, it did
not give the board exclusive control over economic
activity that requires no dental expertise. And the
Albany-Dougherty County Hospital Authority’s offer-
ing of a sham cover for a merger-to-monopoly is nei-
ther consistent with articulated Georgia policy nor
actively supervised by state policymakers. The proper
scope of the state action immunity doctrine immunizes
none of this anticompetitive conduct.
The district court in Michigan appropriately
rejected BlueCross’s immunity claim, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed that ruling following BlueCross’s inter-
locutory appeal. The district court in North Carolina
similarly dismissed the dentists’ motion to dismiss (fol-
lowing two very erudite opinions by FTC commis-
sioners Kovacic and Rosch that rejected immunity),
and the litigation is now pending before the Fourth
Circuit following the dentists’ appeal. Remarkably, in a
tragically terse opinion, the Eleventh Circuit con-
curred with hospitals’ claim for immunity. Reasoning
that the state granted the county Hospital Authority
the power to purchase hospitals, the court ruled, “In
granting the power to acquire hospitals, the legislature
must have anticipated that such acquisitions would
produce anticompetitive effects.”55 The FTC has peti-
tioned the Supreme Court to review the case. 
These three cases offer the circuit courts and the
Supreme Court the opportunity to clarify the state
action immunity doctrine and limit the growingly
popular maneuver among health care providers to get
protection for anticompetitive conduct. Leaving aside
the providers’ weak doctrinal arguments, both the
courts and antitrust enforcers should recognize the
consequences of leaving unchallenged a legal oppor-
tunity for provider monopolists to avoid prosecution.
The dangers of permitting monopolists to dominate
certain markets are exacerbated when a monopolist
has an additional opportunity to exploit a political
process that bestows monopoly power. Both the like-
lihood of monopolization and the potential for politi-
cal graft are greatly increased. In a highly regulated
and highly subsidized industry in which political
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machinery already serves private ambitions, the bor-
ders of a doctrine that protects politically connected
monopolists need to be carefully patrolled. 
Requiring Unbundling of Monopolized Services.
Any effort to restore price competition in health care
markets must include a strategy that targets already-
concentrated markets. Antitrust enforcers therefore
need to develop policy instruments that target current
monopolists, both to limit the economic harm they
inflict and to thwart their efforts to expand their
monopoly power. 
One promising step could be to require hospitals
and other provider entities to unbundle, at a pur-
chaser’s request, certain services so that the purchaser
can negotiate prices. Providers routinely bundle serv-
ices for unified payments, which can increase effi-
ciency and reduce costs associated with providing
closely intertwined services. However, when
providers bundle monopolized and unmonopolized
services, anticompetitive consequences can result: the
monopolist can squeeze out rivals in the competitive
market, creating for itself another monopoly, and by
squelching rivals in the competitive market, the
monopolist limits entrants’ ability to challenge its
hold on the monopolized market. The magnified con-
sequences of health care monopolies should heighten
concern over practices that can expand or enshrine
provider monopolists.
The general antitrust rule on tying is that a firm
with market power may not force customers to pur-
chase unwanted goods or services.56 If this principle
is invoked to frustrate hospitals’ practice of negotiat-
ing comprehensive prices for large bundles of serv-
ices, purchasers could then bargain down the prices
of services with good substitutes.57 If a hospital still
wishes to fully exploit its various monopolies, it
would have to do so in discrete negotiations, making
its highest prices visible. Health plans could then
hope to realize significant savings by challenging such
monopolies, either by inducing enrollees to seek care
in alternative venues (effectively expanding the geo-
graphic market) or by encouraging other providers to
enter the monopolized market. Often the mere threat
of new entry is sufficient to modify a monopolist’s
demands, but entry is more credible if the monopo-
lized service is discrete and associated with a distinct
price that entrants can target.
To date, there have been only limited efforts to pre-
vent hospitals from tying their services together in
bargaining with private payers.58 Although hospitals
would argue that bundling generally makes for effi-
cient negotiating and streamlined delivery of care, the
added costs of bargaining service by service could be
easily offset by the lower prices resulting from greater
competition. Recent scholarship on tying and
bundling confirms that permitting a hospital monop-
olist to tie unrelated services expands the monopoly’s
reach, profitability, and longevity and harms con-
sumer welfare.59 The extreme harm from health care
monopolies makes these practices particularly appro-
priate for antitrust scrutiny.
A workable rule would permit antitrust law to
empower a purchaser to demand separate prices for
divisible services that are normally bundled.60
Although one hopes that antitrust courts and a cred-
ible threat of treble damages would discourage a
provider monopolist from retaliating against any pur-
chaser that aggressively challenges its anticompetitive
practices, the costs and delays from such complex
antitrust actions suggest that public enforcement
should supplement private suits. Either regulators
could enable individual payers to demand unbundling
to facilitate their efforts to get better prices or regula-
tors could demand it themselves. This could trigger
more competition and greater efficiency in both the
tied submarkets where monopoly is not a problem
and the tying markets where it is. 
Challenging Anticompetitive Terms in Insurer-
Provider Contracts. Restrictive terms in contracts
between providers and insurers are another poten-
tially fruitful area for antitrust and regulatory atten-
tion in dealing with the provider monopoly problem.
A common practice, for example, is for a provider-
seller to promise to give an insurer-buyer the same
discount from its high prices it might give to a com-
peting health plan. Such price-protection, payment-
parity, or most-favored-nation (MFN) clauses are
common in commercial contracts and reduce frequent
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and costly renegotiation of prices. However, their anti-
competitive effects may sometimes outweigh their effi-
ciencies. Thus, a provider monopolist may find that a
large and important payer is willing to pay its very
high prices only if the provider promises not to charge
lower prices to its competitors. Such a situation appar-
ently arose in Massachusetts, where the common-
wealth’s largest insurer, a BlueCross plan, reportedly
acceded to Partners HealthCare’s demand for a very
substantial price increase only after Partners agreed to
“protect Blue Cross from [its] biggest fear: that Partners
would allow other insurers to pay less.”61
Antitrust law can offer relief against a provider
monopolist that secures its high prices through an
MFN clause with a powerful insurer. Because such
clauses protect insurers against their competitors’ get-
ting better deals, many insurers are likely to give in too
quickly to even extortionate monopolist price
demands. But the availability of an antitrust remedy
(which would probably be only a prospective cease-
and-desist order rather than an award of treble dam-
ages for identifiable harms) might not be sufficient to
deter a powerful provider from granting MFN status to
a dominant insurer. Alternatively, regulatory authori-
ties could prohibit dominant providers from confer-
ring such status. Regulators presumably would be in
as good a position as any party to distinguish between
restrictive agreements that achieve transactional effi-
ciencies and agreements that restrict insurers’ freedom
to cut price deals with competitors. Regulators might
also be sensitive to how MFN clauses can reduce pres-
sure on, and opportunities for, all insurers to seek new
and innovative service arrangements.
A more potent antitrust attack on anticompetitive
MFN clauses would aim at the dominant insurer
demanding them, rather than at the cooperating
provider. The DOJ has recently sued BlueCross
BlueShield of Michigan, a dominant insurer, to enjoin
it from using MFN clauses in its contracts with Michi-
gan hospitals. It alleges that such MFN restrictions
preclude provider price competition and have thus
prevented other insurers from negotiating favorable
hospital contracts.62 Because the MFN clauses in the
Michigan case are alleged—and seem likely—to have
raised prices paid by BlueCross’s competitors and by
self-insured employers, they provide promising tar-
gets not just for public enforcement but also for pri-
vate actions by injured purchasers, in which damages
would be measured (and then trebled, in accordance
with the Sherman Act) by any higher costs the restric-
tions forced them to incur. Indeed, in the wake of the
government’s suit in Michigan,63 the threat of private
lawsuits might quickly end large insurers’ use of MFN
agreements. In Massachusetts, for example, the Blue-
Cross plan should now think long and hard before
renewing (or enforcing) the MFN clause in its con-
tract with Partners HealthCare.
Other contract provisions that threaten price com-
petition are also in use in provider-insurer contracts in
Massachusetts, according to the commonwealth’s
attorney general.64 In particular, so-called “antisteer-
ing” provisions prohibit an insurer from creating
insurance products in which patients are induced to
patronize lower-priced providers. Under such a con-
tractual constraint, a health plan could not offer more
generous coverage—such as reduced cost sharing—
for care obtained from a new market entrant or from a
more distant, perhaps even an out-of-state or out-of-
country, provider.65 Other contractual terms in use in
Massachusetts (and quite possibly in other markets
where BlueCross is dominant) guarantee a dominant
provider that it will not be excluded from any provider
network the health plan might offer its subscribers.
The contractual terms noted here all enshrine the
cooperative supremacy of dominant providers and
dominant insurers. The resulting competitive harm
extends beyond the sustenance of high prices. These
partnerships also foreclose opportunities for con-
sumers to benefit, both directly as patients and 
indirectly as premium payers, from innovative insur-
ance products that competing health plans might oth-
erwise introduce. Antitrust rules can prohibit the use
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of such anticompetitive contract terms to protect
provider monopolies and curb insurer innovation,
and insurance regulators might also bar such provi-
sions wherever they threaten to preclude effective
price competition. These actions remain available even
in the continued presence of a provider monopoly.
Prospects for Meaningful Competition
Many commentators have suggested that the provider
monopoly problem is severe enough to warrant con-
sidering the more radical alternative of regulating
provider prices. Indeed, a growing number of health
policy scholars have already concluded that “because
antitrust policy has proved ineffective in curbing . . .
providers’ market power to win higher payments,
policy makers need to consider approaches including
price caps and all-payer rate setting.”66 Seeking price
regulation, as opposed to market-oriented, solutions
to the growing provider monopoly problem might
become even more attractive after the PPACA, as the
act puts in place a regulatory framework that mean-
ingfully restricts how insurers can purchase health
services. It seems that a policy apparatus akin to util-
ity regulation would emerge naturally from the insur-
ance exchanges and current provider monopolists,
wherein dominant providers assume the role of a pro-
tected quasi-public utility and policymakers set prices
and output.
Conceding to a utility model means giving up the
potential benefits of competition. Even though the
current system arguably is the worst of all possible
worlds—unrestrained private spending and
unabashed private profit motives secured with public
regulations that discourage entry or structural
change—many, especially economists, maintain faith
in the entrepreneurial promise of market forces.
Wholesale reconfiguration of the delivery system and
attention to individualized needs, for example, are
more likely to emerge from a decentralized system.
Thus, even with a highly concentrated provider 
market, public policies and private initiatives can
stimulate competition in health care and the result-
ing benefits of market forces. The likelihood that
competition-oriented initiatives will succeed is a func-
tion both of the conviction underlying those policies
and the flexibility that the PPACA’s regulators furnish
to market innovators.
Administrative Restraints and Interregional Com-
petition. The PPACA’s passage was largely motivated
by Americans’ deep frustration with (and, often, dis-
trust of) insurance companies. To be sure, America’s
insurers have not done much to endear themselves to
their subscribers, failing to convince many Americans
that they possess the commitment and innovative zeal
to create greater value in the health care delivery
system they finance. In response, the PPACA limits
what health plans can spend on administration,
including imposing a “medical loss ratio” that requires
insurers to expend a minimum percentage of their
operating budget on health care services.67
Among the “administrative” costs this limits are
investments in monitoring and improving the deliv-
ery of care. Such monitoring and organizational costs
are frequently decried as costly intrusions on the 
doctor-patient relationship, but they have the poten-
tial to meaningfully streamline and even transform
the delivery of care. Requiring minimum expendi-
tures in medical services will only exacerbate the
harms of moral hazard, including excessive con-
sumption, overincentives to use expensive but cost-
ineffective technologies, and restrictions on payers’
ability to negotiate competitive prices. Anyone con-
cerned with provider monopolies would be alarmed
that medical loss ratios might further disarm payers in
aggressive price negotiations with providers. But the
larger cost in restricting administrative expenses is the
possibility that it will stamp out innovations in the
organization of health care delivery.
The most effective mechanism in battling local
monopolies in health care might be the same mecha-
nism used to combat costly local or domestic produc-
ers of other goods: expanding the locus of
competition. Some self-insured employers have
already begun to creatively exploit national competi-
tion, searching outside local markets to provide health
care for their employees. North Carolina–based Lowe’s
Company Inc., for example, now encourages its
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employees to travel to the Cleveland Clinic for heart
procedures, citing the clinic’s superior outcomes and
lower costs compared to local providers.68
Although most insurers are committed to preserv-
ing mutually beneficial relationships with local
providers, some have also started searching for out-of-
network providers to deliver care to their subscribers.
United Healthcare, for example, has experimented
with offering its insureds from across the United
States the option to seek care from Mayo Clinic physi-
cians and hospitals as in-network providers.69 Some
adventurous employers and insurers are even sending
their subscribers abroad. BlueCross BlueShield of
South Carolina has even created a subsidiary for med-
ical tourism, Companion Global Healthcare, that
maintains a network of international doctors and
accredited institutions in thirteen countries, including
Thailand, India, Costa Rica, Ireland, and Turkey.70
When purchasers of health care services start
shopping nationally and internationally for providers,
competitive forces awaken with the potential to
reshape provider strategies. Many providers have
aimed to capitalize on the expanding markets for
health care travel, with several specialty hospitals in
the United States now seeking to attract patients from
insurers and other medical intermediaries.71 In the
same vein, providers outside the United States—for
example, in the Cayman Islands and India—are mar-
keting themselves to self-insured employers and
insurers seeking high-quality services at competitive
prices for their subscribers.72
Although traveling for health care might introduce
a new set of costs, it is a highly effective way to infuse
competition into locally monopolized markets. More-
over, the effects of such competition should not be
underestimated. Broadening the geographic market
ushers in new providers that can introduce new strate-
gies, training, and orientations toward health care
delivery. Exposure to diverse strategies and new orga-
nizational delivery mechanisms can only intensify
competition that rewards cost-reducing innovations
local monopolies are not inclined to pursue.73
In short, facilitating interregional competition
could loosen the grip of some monopolists. Because
certain health care services can be delivered only by
local providers (although distance technologies con-
tinue to push the envelope), meaningfully reducing
the costs of health care monopolies will continue to
require the other initiatives I have described. The
emergence of medical tourism offers enormous
potential to bring down health care costs and improve
quality. However, the PPACA’s implementation—and,
in particular, its calculation and employment of the
medical loss ratio—might hamstring insurers and
self-insured employers from investing in this innova-
tive form of shopping for health care. 
“Essential Health Benefits” and Far-Sighted
Health Care. Another of the PPACA’s regulatory
requirements—perhaps the most important and cer-
tainly, given its import, the most underscrutinized—
is its requirement that by 2014, all health plans, both
those offered in insurance exchanges and those
offered externally, cover, at minimum, “essential
health benefits.”74 Such benefits must be “equal to the
scope of benefits provided under a typical employer
plan, as determined by the Secretary [following a sur-
vey of private plans].”75
Some have already observed that this requirement
means that “consumers with this new statutory enti-
tlement . . . will be locked into a system reflecting not
their own preferences, values, and interests but those
of the health care industry itself and its most elite cus-
tomers. They will have little opportunity to purchase
less costly coverage in order to put the available
resources, either their own or society’s, to what they
might regard as better use.”76 Federal rules that define
what insurers must offer as benefits actually impose as
much, if not more, of a “mandate” on consumers than
does the general “individual mandate” to purchase
insurance. Constitutional challenges to the PPACA—
alleging infringements to personal liberty—have
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focused exclusively on the latter requirement to pur-
chase minimum coverage,77 but the final scope and
scale of the essential health benefits provision is more
likely to be the biggest constraint on consumer free-
dom. This requirement might also prevent meaning-
ful reform to health care delivery that, in addition to
providing value to consumers, could effectively chal-
lenge health care monopolists.
Perhaps the most burdensome feature of the
essential health benefits requirement is its preoccu-
pation with traditional medical services. Much has
been written about the nation’s unsustainable
reliance on expensive traditional care, but a growing
body of literature has additionally suggested that a
menu of low-cost, nonmedical alternatives can pro-
duce results superior to traditional care. New Jersey’s
Medicaid program, featured recently in the New
Yorker, has both improved outcomes and reduced
costs for expensive patients by providing counselors
and social workers to address life habits that exacerbate
debilitating chronic illnesses.78 The key has been trans-
forming the delivery system from one that responds to
consumers seeking medical services to one that aggres-
sively targets patients with behavioral interventions.
Similar efforts have proven effective in Massachusetts,
where a variety of nonmedical interventions—a tar-
geted intervention for hypertension self-management,
tailored behavior change goals and skills training, peer
support groups, informational resources through web-
site and telephone support, and periodic telephone
counseling calls—proved similarly successful in reduc-
ing obesity and hypertension in a high-risk, socioeco-
nomically disadvantaged patient population.79
These results largely confirm earlier successes in
Medicaid demonstration projects80 and research
examining health effects of Head Start programs,81
which found links between behavioral interventions
and far-sighted health behaviors. Although no magic
formula or established regimen reliably induces use-
ful behavioral changes, the potential health benefits
from nonmedical interventions are undeniable.
Health plans eager to experiment with low-cost and
creative nonmedical interventions—especially those
interested in preempting costly medical care—should
be encouraged to do so.
Just as monopoly power in local markets should
spur provider competition across regions, monopoly
power in markets for traditional health care services
should spur a search for viable nonmedical substitutes.
To be sure, there is a reason Medicaid beneficiaries—
who do not have the luxury of protesting unconven-
tional benefits packages—have been the ones subject
to experimentation with nonmedical interventions
thus far; similarly, there is a reason that Medicaid
administrators, rather than private payers, have been
the ones forced to experiment. Indeed, private insureds
would need a deep appreciation of both the unsus-
tainability of current spending trajectories and the
enormous savings (and comparable outcomes) avail-
able from nonmedical interventions before being com-
fortable with such a move. But because our trajectory
is indeed dire, pursuit of a foundational reconceptual-
ization of health care delivery is not so far-fetched. The
implementation of PPACA’s regulations—how medical
loss ratios are calculated and what qualifies as essential
health benefits, for example—will significantly deter-
mine whether federal policies encourage or impede
this sort of experimentation.
Conclusion
There is an urgent need to recognize the unusually
serious consequences, for both consumers and the
general welfare, of leaving insured consumers
exposed to monopolized health care markets.
Because health insurance, especially as it is designed
and administered in the United States, hugely
expands a monopolist’s pricing freedom, market
power causes wealth-redistributing and misallocative
effects substantially more serious than conventional
monopoly power. Although this point has been
almost completely absent from the antitrust and eco-
nomics literature,82 its importance plausibly dwarfs
all other factors responsible for the extraordinarily
high cost of US health care.83
Vigorous, rather than tentative or circumspect,
enforcement of the antitrust laws can mitigate the
harms from provider market power. Retrospectively
scrutinizing earlier horizontal mergers of hospitals or
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other providers could help correct decades of ineffec-
tual enforcement, but if looking backward remains
unlikely, renewed rigor moving forward is all the more
essential. Parties proposing new mergers and alliances,
whether traditional associations or new ACOs, must
convincingly show that their reorganization either
leads to only a minimal increase in market power or
creates specific efficiencies. Other measures should
target current monopolists to prevent the enshrine-
ment or expansion of their market dominance. An
antitrust or regulatory initiative to curb hospitals’
bundling practices and prohibit anticompetitive con-
tracts between payers and providers—perhaps as
remedies for earlier mergers found unlawful after the
fact—might also significantly reduce the extraordinary
pricing freedom that hospital and other monopolists
enjoy by virtue of US-style health insurance. 
Another path to reducing the power of provider
monopolies is to encourage creativity among third-
party purchasers. Health plans that bypass, or foster
new competitors for, local monopolists promote price
and quality competition where it is currently lacking,
thus undermining the potency of insurance plus
monopolies. A pro-competition regulatory agenda
should seek ways to facilitate such interregional com-
petition, or at the very least scrutinize how medical
loss ratio rules and other regulations might impede it.
Additional hope lies in the possibility that health
insurers and third-party purchasers will purchase
(and that PPACA regulations will let them purchase)
proven nonmedical interventions that improve health
and reduce health care costs. The exorbitant prices for
monopolized medical services should encourage
health insurers to develop creative alternatives, both
seeking effective (and less costly) substitutes and reor-
ganizing what has become a fragmented, error-prone,
and inefficient delivery system.
Unfortunately, health insurers have not shown
much eagerness to either contest provider market
power or pursue meaningful innovations providing
care for their subscribers. As investigations in Michi-
gan and Massachusetts reveal, insurers all too often
become coconspirators with provider monopolists,
agreeing to exclusive agreements that protect both
themselves and monopolists but gouge consumers.
Insurers’ failure to act as aggressive purchasing agents
for consumers is due partly to how the true cost of
insurance remains hidden and partly to consumers’
undue reluctance to accept anything less than the
best. If consumers were both aware of the true cost of
their health coverage and conscious that they, rather
than someone else, are paying for it, they surely
would demand more value from their insurers. But US
health plans appear inadequately motivated to reduce
costs and overly hesitant to adopt innovative strategies
with associated legal or political risks. Any hope for the
future of US health care is tempered by doubts about
the ability and willingness of US health insurers—
as well as insurance regulators and elected officials
who purchase insurance for public employees—to
take the aggressive actions needed to procure appro-
priate, affordable care.
The PPACA, by expanding the reach of health
insurance to many additional millions of Americans,
has the potential to aggravate and extend the signifi-
cant shortcomings of such insurance. Not only does
the new law seem to have no effective answer to the
problem of provider and supplier monopolies, but its
broad extension of coverage is likely to further
amplify the uniquely harmful effects of their market
power. Moreover, its new regulatory requirements—
imposing medical loss ratios and essential health ben-
efits, for example—might constrain innovations
among payers that might create interregional provider
competition or reconfigure a deeply inefficient health
care delivery system. Despite these new regulatory
layers, antitrust policymakers and other regulators
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The exorbitant prices for monopolized
medical services should encourage
health insurers to develop creative
alternatives, both seeking effective (and
less costly) substitutes and reorganizing
what has become a fragmented, error-
prone, and inefficient delivery system.
still have the capacity to foster value-enhancing 
innovation—primarily by preventing the continued
enshrinement of current monopolies. And although
current tax policies and regulations have turned many
insurers into agents for providers rather than for their
subscribers, a potent opportunity remains for third-
party payers to inject the health care sector with
value-creating innovations that redesign both the
offerings and the delivery of care. 
Whatever the PPACA may achieve, its legacy and
cost to the nation will depend largely on whether mar-
ket actors, regulators, and antitrust enforcers can effec-
tively address the provider monopoly problem and
instill desperately needed competition among
providers. In the near future, the cost problem may
become so serious that the temptation to adopt dra-
conian measures, such as direct price controls, will be
irresistible. Competition-oriented policies, however,
could yield substantial benefits both to premium pay-
ers and to an economy that badly needs to find the
most efficient uses for its increasingly limited resources.
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Many have observed that provider market power is a factor in
inflating those prices. See sources in notes 3-4 above. But few
have observed the synergistic effects of monopoly and health
insurance. For example, although Anderson et al. note “vary-
ing degrees of monopoly power on the sell side of the mar-
ket,” their only other suggested explanation for high prices is
that “the buy side of the U.S. health system is relatively weak
by international standards.” The authors seem not to recog-
nize that health insurance itself raises monopolists’ prices or
that the private “buy side” is especially (for reasons given
notes 45–51 above and accompanying text), although not
inevitably, helpless in fighting cost battles in the US system.
83. Excess health care spending in the United States was
recently estimated to be $650 billion per year, equal to nearly
5 percent of gross domestic product. See Eric Jensen and
Lenny Mendonca, Why America Spends More on Health Care
(National Institute for Health Care Management, 2009),
www.nihcm.org/component/content/article/409 (accessed
May 4, 2012).
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